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Philosophy for A Level
Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind
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Book Description
Philosophy for A Level is an accessible textbook for the new 2017 AQA Philosophy syllabus. Structured closely around the AQA specification this textbook covers the two units, Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind, in an engaging and student-friendly way. With chapters on ‘How to do philosophy’, exam preparation providing students with the philosophical skills they need to succeed, and an extensive glossary to support understanding, this book is ideal for students studying philosophy.
Each chapter includes:
- argument maps that help to develop students’ analytical and critical skills
- comprehension questions to test understanding
- discussion questions to generate evaluative argument
- explanation of and commentary on the AQA set texts
- ‘Thinking harder’ sections
- cross-references to help students make connections
- bullet-point summaries of each topic.
The companion website hosts a wealth of further resources, including PowerPoint slides, flashcards, further reading, weblinks and handouts, all structured to accompany the textbook. It can be found at www.routledge.com/cw/alevelphilosophy.
Table of Contents
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Introduction
How to use this book
How to do philosophy
Following the syllabus
Additional features
Using the anthology
Glossary
Companion website and further resources
1 How to do philosophy
Philosophical argument
Deductive argument
Inductive argument
Understanding arguments
Evaluating arguments
Evaluating claims
An aside: why reason?
Fallacies
Reading philosophy
Approaching the text
Engaging with the text
Beyond the text
Writing philosophy
What you need to know
Planning an essay
Writing an essay
A standard essay structure
General advice
2 Philosophy of religion
I. The concept and nature of ‘God’ A. God’s attributes
Omniscience
Omnipotence
Aquinas on omnipotence
Supreme goodness (omnibenevolence)
God and time
Thinking harder: Stump and Kretzmann on eternity
Key points: God’s attributes
B. Arguments for the incoherence of the concept of God
The paradox of the stone
Omnipotence and supreme goodness
The Euthyphro dilemma
Plato’s dilemma
Omnipotence and morality
Discussion
Omniscience and free human beings
Thinking harder: three solutions
Key points: Arguments for the incoherence of the concept of God
Summary: the concept and nature of ‘God’
II. Arguments relating to the existence of God
A. Ontological arguments
St Anselm’s ontological argument
Gaunilo’s ‘perfect island’ objection Thinking harder: Anselm’s reply
Descartes’ ontological argument
Two objections to ontological arguments
Empiricist objections to a priori arguments for existence
Kant’s objection: existence is not a predicate
Malcolm’s ontological argument
Thinking harder: a response to Malcolm
Key points: ontological arguments
B. Teleological/design arguments
The design argument from analogy
Hume’s objections
Paley’s design argument
Discussion
The problem of spatial disorder
Evolution by natural selection
Swinburne’s design argument
Swinburne’s response to Hume
Thinking harder: is the existence of a designer a good explanation?
Is the designer God?
Hume’s objections
Swinburne’s response
Key points: the argument from design
C. The cosmological argument
The Kalam argument
Thinking harder: infinity
Aquinas’ First and Second Ways
Aquinas’ Second Way
Aquinas’ First Way
Thinking harder: Descartes’ cosmological argument Two issues for arguments from causation
Hume on the causal principle
Thinking harder: The possibility of an infinite series
Aquinas’ Third Way
Leibniz’s argument from contingency
Two more issues for cosmological arguments
Russell on the fallacy of composition
The impossibility of a necessary being
Key points: the cosmological argument
D. The problem of evil
An outline of the problem
Two types of evil
Thinking harder: Midgley on human evil
The logical problem of evil
A free will theodicy
Thinking harder: Midgley on free will
Plantinga’s free will defence
Natural evil
The evidential problem of evil
Plantinga’s free will defence again
Hick’s ‘soul-making’ theodicy
Key points: the problem of evil
Summary: arguments relating to the existence of God
III. Religious language
The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism
Discussion
Verificationism
Objections
Thinking harder: verification and falsification
The ‘University’ debate
Flew’s challenge
Mitchell’s response
Hare’s ‘bliks’
Key points: religious language
Summary: religious language
3 Philosophy of mind
I. What do we mean by ‘mind’?
Features of mental states
Intentionality
Phenomenal properties/qualia
Overview of the six theories
Key points: what do we mean by ‘mind’?
II. Dualist theories: substance dualism
A. Substance dualism
Descartes’ indivisibility argument
The mental is divisible in some sense
Not everything thought of as physical is divisible
Thinking harder: Is the mind a substance?
Descartes’ conceivability argumentMind without body is not conceivable
Thinking harder: What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world
Key points: substance dualism
B. Issues facing substance dualism
Issues facing interactionist substance dualism
The conceptual interaction problem
The empirical interaction problem
Issues facing epiphenomenalist substance dualism
The problem of other minds
The argument from analogy
The existence of other minds in the best hypothesis
Thinking harder: Avramides on Descartes’ solution
Substance dualism makes a ‘category mistake’
Key points: issues facing substance dualism
Summary: substance dualism
III. Physicalist theories
Physicalism
Supervenience
Key points: physicalism
A. Mind–brain type identity theory
Type identity theory
Smart on correlation, identity and reduction
Issues
Putnam and the multiple realisability of mental states
Dualist arguments
Key points: mind–brain type identity theory
B. Eliminative materialism
Patricia Churchland on reduction and elimination
Paul Churchland on why ‘folk psychology’ might be false
Issues
Our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations
Folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis)
Thinking harder: the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting Key points: eliminative materialism
C. Philosophical behaviourism
Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism
Ryle’s ‘soft’ behaviourism
Dispositions
Thinking and other mental processes
Issues
Dualist arguments
Issues defining mental states satisfactorily
The asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states
The distinctness of mental states from behaviour
Key points: philosophical behaviourism
Summary: physicalist theories
IV. Functionalism
What is a function?
Functionalism and behaviourism
Functionalism and multiple realisability
Issues
The possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia)
Block on the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia
Thinking harder: Chalmers on explaining consciousness
Key points: functionalism
Summary: functionalism
V. Dualist theories: property dualism A. Property dualism
The theory
The knowledge argument
The knowledge argument as a dualist argument against other theories
Responses to the knowledge argument
Mary does not gains new propositional knowledge, but does gain ability knowledge
Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge, but does gain acquaintance knowledge
Thinking harder: Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way
The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument
Possible worlds
Chalmers’ zombie argument
Thinking harder: how arguments for property dualism work
The zombie argument as a dualist argument against other theories
Responses to the zombie argument
A philosophical zombie (or zombie world) is not conceivable
Thinking harder: what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
Thinking harder: what is metaphysical possible tells us nothing about the actual world
Key points: property dualism
B. Issues facing property dualism
Issues facing interactionist property dualism
Issues facing epiphenomenalist property dualism
The phenomenology of our mental life
Natural selection
Thinking harder: introspective self-knowledge
The problem of other minds
Property dualism makes a ‘category mistake’
Key points: issues facing property dualism
Summary: property dualism
4 Preparing for the exam
The examination
The structure of the exam
Assessment objectives
Understanding the question: giving the examiners what they are looking for
Three-mark questions
Five-mark questions
12-mark questions
25-mark questions Revision: it’s more than memory
Exam technique: getting the best result you can
Revision tips
Exam tips
Glossary (with Joanne Lovesey)
Index by syllabus content
Index
Author(s)
Biography
Michael Lacewing is a teacher of philosophy and theology at Christ’s Hospital school, and a former Reader in Philosophy and Vice-Principal Academic at Heythrop College, University of London. He is founder of the company A Level Philosophy (www.alevelphilosophy.co.uk), and advises the British Philosophical Association on matters related to philosophy in schools.
Reviews
'Michael Lacewing has a talent of making complex concepts accessible to a range of students with his ‘student-friendly’ style. His materials are concise, thorough and prepare students well for their examinations. His book has a clear layout and is appropriate for the specification.'
Karen S. Ackerman, Alleyns School, UK
'Philosophy for A-Level is a clear and lucid account that directly links and covers the new A-Level specification. The content is challenging but so well organised that it guides the students through some of the most difficult metaphysical questions in Philosophy. It will be a valuable resource for student and teacher.'
Amanda Forshaw, Head of Humanities, Woodhouse College, UK